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LIGHTNING - APOLLO TO SHUTTLE
W. R. Durrett 
John F. Kennedy Space Center
ABSTRACT
The lightning discharge that struck the Apollo 12 
spacecraft thirty-six seconds after launch pointed 
up a whole series of problems that called out for 
answers if the Manned Space Program were to 
proceed with minimum impact to future missions 
and the crews that would fly them. This paper 
traces the history of lightning study by the 
Kennedy Space Center from then to now with par­ 
ticular emphasis on the potential problems that 
may arise in the process of getting ready for and 
carrying out the Space Shuttle Program.
LIGHTNING - APOLLO TO SHUTTLE
The experiences of the Apollo Program with 
lightning strikes at the Kennedy Space Center 
began with very little formality and with almost 
no lost time. On May 25, 1966, the first Apollo 
vehicle rolled out of the Vehicle Assembly 
Building. This was the 500F proof-test vehicle - 
a full-scale mockup of a Saturn V moon mission 
vehicle mounted on the Mobile Launcher and 
identical in size and weight to the real thing. 
Its purpose was to provide a full dress exercise 
of the Crawler and to validate the facilities at 
Pad A of Launch Complex 39. The rollout was a 
success, and the vehicle was on the pad as of 
that afternoon. Two days later, May 27, 1966, 
the Launcher Umbilical Tower (LUT) on the Mobile 
Launcher (ML) took a strike. The hook on the 
hammerhead crane on top of the LUT began dropping 
in free fall as its brakes let go, and struck the 
side of the second stage. The damage was not 
severe, but the Apollo/lightning interface had 
begun. Examination showed the brake drum solenoid 
contacts welded open.
The lightning protection design for Apollo had 
been adopted after consideration of many concepts 
for protection of the vehicle during rollout and 
while at the pad. The concepts examined covered 
almost every possible approach:- masts along the 
crawlerway, balloons carrying grounded wires, 
balloons carrying lightning rods, kites, folding 
screens enclosing the flight vehicle until launch 
time, towed structures carrying shielding 
enclosures that moved back for launch, telescoping 
shrouds mounted on the LUT, removable grounded 
shrouds mounted above the vehicle - the solutions 
were literally legion. Each one was looked at
carefully for the protection offered, cost, 
operational practicality, ruggedness, and safety. 
Nothing was considered "crackpot" at this stage. 
Every solution was given the same screening. The 
final choice was, as nearly always, compromise. 
There were concepts that offered better pad 
protection than the one selected, and concepts 
that offered better rollout protection, but none 
that cost less or that did both jobs any better. 
The design consisted of a folding mast (to allow 
access in and out of the VAB doors) mounted on 
top of the hammerhead crane on top of the LUT, 
with a lightning rod on top. The assembly 
extended above the vehicle sufficiently so that 
a lightning stroke would terminate on the 
lightning rod and not strike the vehicle itself. 
This concept is known as the 1:1 cone of pro­ 
tection:- as long as the mast is higher above the 
tip of the vehicle than it is displaced from it 
horizontally, the 1:1 concept is satisfied. 
Historically, the 1:1 cone of protection provides 
an almost perfect protection umbrella from 
lightning striking anything under it, and it 
proved so in Apollo - no flight vehicle was ever 
struck on the pad, although the LUT itself was 
struck many times. When this occurred, the 
strike current passed from the lightning rod down 
the mast structure, past the hammerhead crane 
through wiping shoes (that allowed crane movement) 
and through the welded LUT structure and Mobile 
Launcher to ground. The whole pad area had an 
elaborate buried ground counterpoise of many 
copper cables, and at the pad the Mobile Launcher 
was connected to it by ground jumpers on each of 
the six outer pedestals that supported the Mobile 
Launcher. There were, in addition, many other 
ground paths from the structure by way of hyper- 
golic lines, fuel lines, and the multitude of 
other installed paths that exist when a moon 
rocket is connected to its ground support equip­ 
ment for checkout prior to launch.
There was no lightning instrumentation on the LUT 
for that first rollout, but by October of 1968, 
for the first manned Saturn V (Apollo 8) rollout, 
magnetic slugs (to record peak stroke current) 
and a lightning stroke counter had been added to 
the lightning mast above the LUT's crane. The 
pad was under TV surveillance, but the video was 
not recorded.
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Apollo's busiest launch year was 1969. Five
vehicles went to the pads in that twelve-month 
period* There had been no strikes since the. 
first one in 1966, but in 1967 and 1968 the pads 
were empty during the summer storm months, and 
no LUT's had been there to be targets. This was 
not the case in 1969, but even so, no strikes to 
the complex were recorded, Apollo 11 took off 
on July 16 for its moon landing after being on 
the pad for substantially the full 1969 storm 
sea,son 9 but it took no strokes.
This period of bliss disappeared abruptly on 
November 9, 1969, when Apollo 12, thirty-six 
seconds into its flight, triggered a cloud-to- 
ground stroke that momentarily put the space­ 
craft's guidance system out of commission. The 
booster's guidance system, in command at this 
point of the mission* was not disrupted, and the 
mission continued. It wasn't a strike on the pad, 
but the distinction didn't really amount to much; 
from that day forward the.Kennedy Space-Center 
became lightning conscious.
The year 1970 was a repeat of 1967 and 1968 in 
that there were no launches during the summer 
months:- Apollo 13 was launched on April 11 and 
Apollo 14 did not rollout until November 9.
There were no known strikes that year.
(The Mobile Service Structure, almost as tall as 
the LUT, had been at its parksite south of the 
pads since 1965 when it was not on the pad for 
checkout. It had magnetic slugs mounted on the 
various lightning rods that protected its vent 
stacks and extremities but their locations were 
almost inaccessible and they had not been serviced 
regularly because of the hazard to servicing 
personnel. Although it is possible that it had 
been struck at the parksite, there was no valid . 
data to support known strike activity.)
In 1971 the picture changed drastically. Storms 
delayed Apollo 14's launch on January 31, but it 
was rainshowers, not lightning. Apollo 15 went 
to the pad on May 11 and was launched on July 26. 
Its stay on the pad nicely spanned the lightning 
season, and in this two-month stretch, lightning 
hit the complex on six different days:- June 14, 
15, and 25, and July 2, 19, and 21. The first 
strike, recorded at 98,000 amperes, vaporized 
the top three feet of the LUT lightning rod and 
blew the face off the stroke counter. The 1971 
storms were severe, and the three June storms 
caused damage to ground equipment. Examination 
revealed some cable shields that had not been 
properly grounded, allowing induced voltages to 
be fed into the electronics and overload them. 
This was corrected, and the last three strike 
days (in July) saw no damage. The launch went on 
schedule.
(There is no way of knowing for sure how many 
times the complex was struck during those six 
days. A single lightning flash can include any­ 
where from one to fifteen discrete strokes, of 
varying polarities, magnitudes and durations, 
Magnetic slugs show only the aggregate of the
stroke current magnetic fields they have been 
exposed to, and the stroke counter could not be 
relied on to resolve every separate strike - its 
reaction time did not exceed 0.1 seconds even 
when working. In those six strike days it is 
not inconceivable that the complex may have taken 
forty to fifty separate lightning strokes.)
The year 1972 again had vacant pads during the 
summer; Apollo 16 launched April 17, .ami Apollo 17 
was on the pad from September 13 through 
December 6. There were two strike days in March, 
the 5th and 31st. No damage resulted.
The lightning mast from Pad 34 was mounted on the 
MSS in 1972. Wide and deep as well as tall, much 
of the MSS was not inside the 1:1 cone of pro­ 
tection of the LUT's lightning mast and was 
subject to being struck at almost any point on 
its upper surfaces. The mast gave it a single 
preferred attach point for a stroke. This 
permitted accessible instrumentation to be 
mounted and also provided the flight vehicle on 
the pad with protection from an additional 1:1 
cone.
(The tip of the MSS mast was 25 ft. lower than 
the LUT mast and 130 ft. south of it when the 
MSS and LUT were both on the pad during checkout. 
This, of course, left the MSS mast as a secondary 
strike point, and as experience showed, it did 
take a few low-energy strikes which came in from 
a generally southerly direction. The stronger 
strokes invariably went to the LUT mast.)
The storms of 1971 had taught two lessons:- 
improve instrumentation, and pay attention to 
indirect lightning effects. Strike current that 
went down the LUT mast to ground didn't go just 
through the LUT. Some of it went across the 
swing arms and to ground through the skin of the 
vehicle and the MSS structure. This did no 
direct damage to the bird, but the current in 
the arm structures induced voltages in the 
umbilical cables leading from the LUT to the 
vehicle. Some of these cables ran for part of 
their lengths along the tops of the arm structures 
and were thus exposed to the maximum induction 
fields set up by the stroke current flowing in 
the swing arms. An analysis revealed that 31.6% 
of the total current from a stroke to the LUT of 
a Skylab/ASTP configuration would flow across 
Swing Arms #8 and #7, which carried the umbilical 
cables which led to the spacecraft's guidance 
system, and the cables going to the Instrument 
Unit mounted on top of the S-IVB third stage and 
containing the booster launch guidance system. 
To monitor these effects, peak reading voltmeters 
were installed to record the voltages on selected 
cables that ran across Swing Arms #6, #7, and #8. 
This was done for Apollo 17, but no data was 
gathered because Apollo 17 took no strikes during 
its time on the pad. The system was then carried 
over into 1973 and the Skylab Program.
Instrumentation on the pad was not the only 
lightning measuring done. Operations on the 
launch pad involved many people working on,
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around and with tall metal structures, liquid and 
gaseous oxygen, large volumes of volatiles and 
combustibles, cryogenics, hypergolic fuels, and 
pyrotechnics. This carried a large danger 
quotient if the hazards of a thunderstorm were 
ignored. To this end KSC had, in 1965, commenced 
the installation of a wide area network of 
thunderstorm monitors to report to a central 
weather office the existing potential gradient 
of the atmosphere above each monitor instrument. 
When high readings began to appear, indicating a 
rising electrification of the air, the weather 
office was able to issue an adverse weather 
warning to the operating areas so that the proper 
safety measures could be taken before bad weather 
arrived. This network, constructed in phases, 
consisted of twenty-five monitoring stations 
spread over almost a hundred square miles by the 
time Apollo 11 rolled out in May of 1969. The 
original Sweeney instruments were phased out in 
favor of rotating field mills, and by the end of 
1972, steps were in process to present the output 
of the field mills in the weather office as an 
integrated display.
The year 1973 opened with a known heavy launch 
schedule for the Skylab Program. Pad B had been 
refitted to handle the Saturn IB vehicle to be 
used as astronaut carriers up to and back from 
the lab, and there were exactly eighty-five days 
in the year when vehicle checkout was not in 
progress on the pad. Lightning coverage of this 
program was comprehensive. The field mill network 
was in full operation. The KSC Weather Office 
had a new experimental X-band weather radar that 
could probe developing cloud masses for glaciation 
and precipitation levels to help in the task of 
predicting thunderstorms. The pads were under 
surveillance by three lightning-triggered fish- 
eye lens cameras that photographed the entire sky 
and by the operational television system that put 
selected cameras in a video recording mode when 
an adverse weather warning was in force. Instru­ 
mentation coils sensed any stroke current that 
appeared in the Mobile Launcher and MSS pedestals 
and current sensing coils had been mounted on 
the ML and MSS lightning masts just below the 
magnetic slugs. Lightning induced voltages were 
monitored in thirteen selected circuits whose 
cables ran across the upper sensing arms of the 
LUT, with control readings to winnow out power!ine 
surges.
The 1973 storm season did its part. Multiple 
stroke flashes hit both Pad A and Pad B on May 9. 
The Pad A strike, where the Skylab itself sat on 
a moon configuration booster, was 36,000 amperes 
to the LUT mast. The Pad B stroke, 76,000 amperes, 
hit the astronaut's safety slidewire about halfway 
out its 2200 ft. length. On May 24, a 4,100 
ampere single stroke hit the MSS mast. No damage 
anywhere and the Skylab 1 and 2 launches went off 
on May 14 and 24.
Skylab 3 went to the pad on June 11, and got 
slapped hard on June 17 when a severe storm sat 
above the pad for over an hour. Multiple strokes 
were recorded to both LUT and MSS. The maximum
stroke magnitudes were above the 100,000 ampere 
(saturation) level of the magnetic slugs on the 
LUT, with a 64,000 ampere peak on the MSS. The 
mast-mounted coils did not provide reliable data; 
the coil output leads running down the lightning 
masts of both LUT and MSS were picking up induced 
voltages that invalidated the readings. Induction- 
proof output leads were needed, a difficult task 
when the leads ran within inches of 100,000 
ampere plus pulsed currents. The June 17 strikes 
were severe enough to damage some of the more 
sensitive on-board instrumentation signal con­ 
ditioners which were mounted close to the skin 
of the vehicle, but repairs did not delay the 
launch on July 28.
The MSS had two strike days right after the 
launch. A 57,000 ampere multiple stroke was 
recorded on July 29, and three separate flashes 
containing a total of nine strikes occurred on 
August 1. This last gave a good illustration of 
the weakness of magnetic slugs as recorders. The 
peak magnitude recorded by the slugs for August 1 
was 4,200 amperes, while the peak sensing coil 
recorded 200,000+ amperes. The coil reading was 
admittedly not valid by previous experience, but 
the difference shows that the slugs did not 
record the actual peak magnitude. Obviously 
there had been polarity differences in the nine 
strokes.
Skylab 4 showed again the importance of high 
integrity in the overall shields of cables that 
are exposed to the induced effects of lightning 
currents. A multiple-stroke 100,000+ ampere 
bolt hit the LUT on August 15, a few hours after 
its arrival on the pad after rollout on August 14. 
All the cabling changes to pad configuration had 
not been completed, and a temporary cable on 
Swing Arm #8 was still connected into the 
Command Module with its shield grounded only at' 
one end. Damage occurred in the Inertia! 
Measurement Unit blower motor control system, 
and again some of the more sensitive instrumen­ 
tation signal conditioners mounted near the skin 
were affected. Repairs did not delay the launch 
on November !6.
The lightning and weather encountered in the 
Apollo and Skylab Programs prompted a thorough 
study of the adverse effects they might impose 
on the Apollo Soyuz Test Project. This mission 
had to work with unusually narrow launch windows 
that were dictated by the orbital requirements 
for rendezvous and docking with Soyuz, and it was 
scheduled for launch on July 15, the middle of 
KSC's thunderstorm season. Weather that did not 
fall inside the limits given by the Launch-Mission 
Rules, or retesting required because of a 
lightning stroke that occurred late in the count, 
could scrub a launch and jeopardize the mission. 
A series of tests was performed at KSC on the 
Command and Service Modules and on the Saturn IB 
booster stages to determine what induced currents 
could be withstood safely. These would guide an 
analysis of where the Launch Mission Rules might 
be revised to help assure an on-schedule launch. 
Full scale tests were conducted in which
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simulated lightning strikes were fed into the 
stages and the Induced voltages monitored*
At the same time, a design effort was begun to 
come up with a lightning protection system for 
the pad that would eliminate or minimize the 
Induced effects that had been noted during 
Skylab, This meant either eliminating lightning 
strikes completely to the LUT and MSS or 
minimiltog the flow of stroke current in the LUT 
swing arms. Studies were made to evaluate various 
methods of preventing lightning strokes from 
hitting the complex. It was obvious very quickly 
that any proven solutions would be very expensive, 
and attention turned to reduction of the swing arm 
currents* The design modification settled on 
involved replacing the folding metal lightning 
mast in the LUT with an insulated mast which would 
support an overhead wire running over the mast and 
to ground out 1000 ft. on each side of the pad. 
Stroke current in this design would go to ground 
through the overhead wire, not through the LUT 
structure, and there would be no stroke current 
flow across the swing arms. The overhead wire 
was oriented to be at 90° to the swing arms, 
minimi zing any induced currents in the arms from 
the stroke current in the overhead wire. The 
mast was made tall enough (80 ft.) to hold the 
wire at least 50 ft. from the nearest grounded 
metal portion of the LUT to prevent arc-over from 
the wire. Laboratory tests showed this design 
would reduce the induced voltage in the most 
sensitive swing arm to 4% of the Apollo/Skylab 
configuration, and would afford as good or better 
direct stroke protection to the vehicle. The 
instrumentation that had been on the old folding 
mast was removed and installed at each end of the 
overhead wire, thus making two identical sets. 
At each station, the peak sensing coil output was 
converted to light energy and taken back to the 
readout instrumentation by fiber-optic light pipes, 
which are not sensitive to heavy induction fields 
from stroke current. The magnetic slugs were 
retained and a second sensing coil installed. 
This coil was a special di/dt coil* sensitive to 
rate of change of current rather than current 
value. Both peak and di/dt coils fed separate 
transient analyzers, which reconstructed and read 
out the stroke's waveform as well as its magnitude. 
This permitted the analysis of the strike for 
duration and rise time as well as magnitude, and 
better intelligence of what damage (if it occurred) 
was actually due to.
The instrumentation was mocked up in the VAB and 
tested in the same kind of tests that were used
to determine the sensitivity of the CSM and the 
S-IB booster to simulated lightning* The simu­ 
lated lightning tests conducted in 1974 at KSC 
showed that both the CSM and the S-IB were subject 
to large induced voltages in their cabling from a 
strike. This emphasized the importance of pro­ 
tection from Induced effects on the pad, and good 
knowledge of the electrification of the air over 
the pad at launch time, particularly at higher 
altitudes.
There were no manned launches in 1974, and con­ 
sequently the only tall structure on the pad at
LC-39 was the MSS. It was used as a test bed to 
investigate the possibility that dissipation 
arrays might have some effect on the frequency 
or nature of lightning strokes, and several 
configurations were erected on the MSS and 
monitored. Another array was mounted on a 
500 ft, weather tower about 3-1/2 miles north­ 
west of the pad. After two years of observation 
(1974 and 1975), there is some data that suggests 
that the arrays may have an effect on the ratio 
of positive to negative strokes that hit, but it 
is far from conclusive. There is no indication 
of any effect at all on the frequency of strikes; 
both structures took hits in both years, five on 
the MSS and four on the weather tower. Peak 
magnitudes ranged from 18,000 amperes to 80,000 
amperes.
During 1975, there were three noteworthy launches - 
the Apollo-Soyuz mission and two Viking unmanned 
launches to Mars. Both projects had launch 
constraints. The Apollo launch, made with the 
Soyuz spacecraft already in orbit, had launch 
windows measured in minutes and only the first 
two could be missed without seriously limiting 
the mission's objectives. The first Viking 
lander was to touch down on Mars on July 4, 1976, 
as a Bicentennial event, which put a cutoff on 
launch date slips. All would launch in the 
summer, during the normal thunderstorm season. 
Plans were made for instrumented aircraft to 
monitor the air electrification at various 
altitudes on launch day for all three launches. 
This, in conjunction with the ground field mill 
readings, would permit the weather office to make 
the best possible launch weather forecasts. In 
this connection, the weather office had two new 
tools to work with in 1975. In the past, the 
field mill readouts in the weather office were 
printed out individually on strip charts and the 
data had to be hand correllated by weather station 
personnel. An improved presentation concept had 
the outputs of all 25 ground field mills computer­ 
ized and presented to the weather personnel as an 
integrated display on a TV screen which showed 
the whole KSC area with the field mill data 
plotted on it in lines of equal potential 
gradient. This display was updated each minute 
and gave a dynamic, overall picture of the size, 
growth and movement of the charge centers over 
the entire launch area.
A second development was the Lightning Detection 
and Ranging (LDAR) system, a KSC development 
following early work by Dr. E. T, Pierce of 
Stanford Research Institute. It senses and plots
RF emissions in the 30-50 MHz range. These 
emissions are apparently associated with atmo­ 
spheric discharges and the L'DAR plots them on a
TV display in altitude, azimuth and range. The 
system is still in development, but it has shown 
some good correlation to the charge centers 
plotted by the field mill network. It stands to 
be a good lightning locator and plotter, 
particularly for storm activity outside the range 
of the field mills.
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The ASTP Apollo rolled out on March 24 and lifted 
off on schedule on July 16. The late-in-count 
strikes which could have been a problem did not 
materialize, nor were there any thunderstorms in 
the near vicinity of the pad to threaten a launch 
hold. KSC's weather had been kind to the Apollo 
Soyuz Test Project - in some respects too kind. 
It had been hoped that the weather would give the 
mast and wire design and its instrumentation a 
good enough workout to prove that it truly would 
reduce the induced effects of a strike the way 
its laboratory tests predicted. As it was, the 
new mast and overhead wire pad protection design 
was struck four times in 1975. The first two 
occurred three minutes apart on May 14, with too 
low a peak magnitude (<10,000 amperes) to 
register on the wire-end instrumentation. Tele­ 
vision pictures of both flashes showed that both 
were low energy, single strokes. A 35,000 ampere 
stroke hit the overhead wire on June 9, and a 
100,000 ampere stroke to the LUT mast occurred on 
July 20. This last stroke came with the LUT still 
on the pad but five days after the launch. It 
was recorded and measured by both coil systems and 
the magnetic slugs with good agreement, and this 
did demonstrate the validity of the wire-end 
instrumentation under actual conditions.
During the full stay of the vehicle on the pad, 
the peak reading voltmeters monitoring the 
critical circuits on Swing Arm #7 had been moni­ 
tored carefully; their readings were the criteria 
for determining whether retest would be required 
after a strike. None of the first three strokes 
caused any detectable current induction. The 
last stroke yielded no valid induction data since, 
after the launch, the current path across the 
arm down the vehicle skin and the MSS to ground 
was not there.
The Viking I and II launches had lightning 
problems of their own. A stroke to ground is 
believed to have been responsible for a surge in 
one of Viking I's control circuits that caused a 
partial switch closure in the payload that pre­ 
maturely drained a flight battery, requiring a 
payload changeout before launch. Viking II, 
however, gave proof that the airborne charge 
measurements planned to be made in the face of 
marginal weather had measurable operational value. 
A storm moved into the vicinity of Viking's launch 
complex as the count approached T-0. According to 
conventional conditions it was a "launch hold" 
situation until the storm moved out of the area. 
The aircraft readings, however, showed that the 
storm's charge centers were moving more slowly 
than predicted. This was relayed to the launch 
director, and Viking II lifted off on schedule. 
Five minutes later the pad was in heavy rain and 
the storm did not clear the pad before the launch 
window would have closed.
Investigating other possible means of preventing 
lightning, an experiment was run following the 
ASTP launch that involved the seeding of selected 
thunderstorms with conductive chaff from aircraft 
to ascertain if this would diminish lightning 
occurrence, and if so, what seeding procedures
gave the best results. The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had done some 
preliminary study in this area that showed 
promise. The experiment showed that a different 
seeding technique would be required for Florida 
storms than was used in the western mountain 
storms that NOAA had studied earlier. Florida 
storms have their freezing level well up inside 
the cloud mass, while mountain storms have theirs 
lower down, toward cloud base, and for the 
seeding to be effective, it must be done so that 
the chaff is drawn into the freezing area. In 
Florida this means penetrating the storm with 
the aircraft - seeding just under the clouds is 
insufficient. That can be hazardous, and needs 
to be studied in more detail. NOAA plans to 
continue investigation of chaff seeding at KSC 
during the summer of 1976 as part of Thunderstorm 
Project II, the nationwide study being conducted 
over the next three years by the scientific and 
academic community to investigate the electrical 
properties of thunderstorms. This effort should 
result in a much fuller understanding of how 
thunderstorms tick. We hope to learn what 
properties must exist before lightning comes into 
being, and how charges in the air and in various 
cloud formations relate to the instrument readings 
probing that same area from ground level. 
Hopefully in the future, the possibility of 
lightning in a storm can be predicted before the 
storm develops, and the storm's development and 
growth charted well ahead of the actual thing. 
The Shuttle is to be an operational vehicle, and 
routine launch operations at present planned 
launch rates will need the best weather knowledge 
and predictability that is available.
The insulated mast and overhead wire is the base­ 
line design for lightning protection of the 
Shuttle while on the pad, so the instrumentation 
and lightning protection developed for ASTP will 
carry over and be the lightning system for the 
Space Shuttle era. The mast will be permanently 
mounted on the Shuttle Service and Access Tower. 
The stainless steel overhead wire will be oriented 
north and south instead of ASTP's east and west, 
but will extend out approximately the same 
distance.
The Shuttle, with its sophisticated electronics, 
stands to be particularly vulnerable to lightning 
and design criteria pointed specifically to 
protect against harmful lightning effects were 
drawn up by a lightning task team early in the 
design phase. Special attention is being given 
to cable shielding and to the level of transients 
that equipment will be able to withstand without 
disruption or damage. The Orbiter will undergo 
an extensive test before it comes to KSC in which 
it will be subjected to full-strength simulated 
lightning entering and leaving the vehicle at 
various points. There is a development program 
in work at KSC that aims toward deliberate 
triggering of a natural stroke to the Service and 
Access Tower, thus permitting the determination of 
induced effects on ground support equipment, and 
measurement under controlled conditions of any 
induced effects that could affect critical
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equipment placement or be transmitted from the 
complex to the vehicle through checkout cabling. 
All the electrical leads from the ground leading
into the Shuttle will interface with the flight 
vehicle as close to the Mobile Launcher Platform 
as possible, to eliminate the high current 
Induction of the Apollo configuration.
When the Shuttle lifts off Pad A in 1979, it will
be a lightning-proofed vehicle launched from a 
lightning-proofed complex* Jove's thunderbolt 
will undoubtedly be with us for many years to 
come* but not as the mystery it has been in the 
past, and the Manned Space Programs will have 
done their share toward drawing the veil.
